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Abstract
Many applications are implemented as multi-tier software systems, and are
executed on distributed infrastructures, like cloud infrastructures, to benefit
from the cost reduction that derives from dynamically allocating resources on-
demand. In these systems, failures are becoming the norm rather than the
exception, and predicting their occurrence, as well as locating the responsible
faults, are essential enablers of preventive and corrective actions that can mit-
igate the impact of failures, and significantly improve the dependability of the
systems. Current failure prediction approaches suffer either from false positives
or limited accuracy, and do not produce enough information to effectively locate
the responsible faults.
In this paper, we present PreMiSE, a lightweight and precise approach to
predict failures and locate the corresponding faults in multi-tier distributed
systems. PreMiSE blends anomaly-based and signature-based techniques to
identify multi-tier failures that impact on performance indicators, with high
precision and low false positive rate. The experimental results that we obtained
on a Cloud-based IP Multimedia Subsystem indicate that PreMiSE can indeed
predict and locate possible failure occurrences with high precision and low over-
head.
Keywords: Failure prediction, Multi-tier distributed systems, Self-healing
systems, Data analytics, Machine learning, Cloud computing
1. Introduction
Multi-tier distributed systems are systems composed of several distributed
nodes organized in layered tiers. Each tier implements a set of conceptually
homogeneous functionalities that provides services to the tier above in the lay-
ered structure, while using services from the tier below in the layered structure.
The distributed computing infrastructure and the connection among the ver-
tical and horizontal structures make multi-tier distributed systems extremely
complex and difficult to understand even for those who developed them.
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Indeed, runtime failures are becoming the norm rather than the exception
in many multi-tier distributed systems, such as ultra large systems [1] systems
of systems [2, 3] and cloud systems [4, 5, 6]. In these systems, failures become
unavoidable due to both their characteristics and the adoption of commodity
hardware. The characteristics that increase the chances of failures are the in-
creasing size of the systems, the growing complexity of the system–environment
interactions, the heterogeneity of the requirements and the evolution of the
operative environment. The adoption of low quality commodity hardware is
becoming common practice in many contexts, notably in cloud systems [7, 8],
and further reduces the overall system reliability.
Limiting the occurrences of runtime failures is extremely important in many
common applications, where runtime failures and the consequent reduced de-
pendability negatively impact on the expectations and the fidelity of the cus-
tomers, and becomes a necessity in systems with strong dependability require-
ments, such as telecommunication systems that telecom companies are migrat-
ing to cloud-based solutions [7].
Predicting failures at runtime is essential to trigger automatic and operator-
driven reactions to either avoid the incoming failures or mitigate their effects
with a positive impact on the overall system reliability. Approaches for predict-
ing failures have been studied in several contexts, such as mobile devices [9, 10],
system performance deviations [11, 12], distributed systems [13, 14], online and
telecommunication applications [15, 16, 17].
Current approaches for predicting failures exploit either anomaly- or signature-
based strategies. Anomaly-based strategies consider behaviors that significantly
deviate from the normal system behavior as symptoms of failures that may oc-
cur in the near future [18, 12, 19, 13, 20, 21, 22]. Anomaly-based techniques
suffer from false positives, because of the difficulty of distinguishing faulty from
rare albeit legal behaviors, in the absence of information about failure patterns.
Signature-based strategies rely on known patterns of failure-prone behaviors,
called signatures, to predict failures that match the patterns [15, 10, 11, 23,
14, 16]. By working with known patterns, signature-based techniques cannot
cope with emerging failures. Moreover, signature-based techniques usually work
with patterns of discrete events, such as error reports and system reboots, and
do not cope well with failures that directly impact on performance indicators
whose values vary in continuous domains over time. Performance indicators with
continuous variables that span a wide range of values are common in multi-tier
distributed systems, and signature-based techniques working on simple sample-
based discretization often have limited accuracy in the presence of combinations
of values not experienced in the past.
In this paper, we present PreMiSE (PREdicting failures in Multi-tIer dis-
tributed SystEms), a novel approach that can accurately predict failures and
precisely locate the responsible faults in multi-tier distributed systems. By ad-
dressing the challenges that characterize complex multi-tier distributed systems,
PreMiSE addresses also the subset of challenges that characterize singe-tier
systems. PreMiSE originally combines signature-based with anomaly-based
approaches, to improve the accuracy of signature-based approaches in predict-
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Figure 1: The overall flow of PreMiSE online activities to predict failures
ing failures that impact on performance indicators. As illustrated in Figure 1,
PreMiSE
- monitors the status of the system by collecting (a large set of) performance
indicators from the system nodes, for instance CPU utilization for each
CPU in the system, that we refer to as Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)
(KPI monitoring in the figure),
- identifies deviations from normal behaviors by pinpointing anomalous
KPIs with anomaly-based techniques (Anomaly detection in the figure),
- identifies incoming failures by identifying symptomatic anomalous KPI
sets with signature-based techniques.(Signature-based failure prediction in
the figure).
In the KPI monitoring activity, PreMiSE collects KPIs from different layers
of the target multi-tier distributed system. KPIs are metrics collected on specific
resources, and are the performance indicators that failure prediction approaches
use to estimate the status of the system. In the anomaly detection activity,
PreMiSE exploits multivariate time series analysis to identify anomalies. In
details, PreMiSE elaborates the KPI values collected during a training phase
to produce a baseline model that represents the legal behavior of the system,
and relies on time series analysis to combine the information from multiple
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KPIs provided in the baseline model for revealing anomalous behaviors. For
example the baseline model can identify a simultaneous increase in both memory
usage and memory cached as either a symptom of an anomalous behavior when
occurring in the presence of a normal workload, or as a normal albeit infrequent
behavior when occurring in the presence of a high workload. The baseline model
accurately reveals anomalies in the behavior of the system as a whole, but
cannot (i) distinguish between malign and benign anomalies, that is, symptoms
of incoming failures from normal albeit uncommon behaviors, (ii) predict the
type of the incoming failures, and (iii) locate the sources of the incoming failures.
In the failure prediction activity, PreMiSE exploits signature-based tech-
niques to accurately distinguish malign from benign anomalies: It identifies the
incoming failures that correspond to malign anomalies, predicts the type of in-
coming failures, and locates the sources of incoming failures. More in details,
PreMiSE uses historical data about correct and failing behaviors to learn pat-
terns that correlate malign anomalies to failure types, and to relate failures
to failure sources. For example, the signature-based failure prediction activity
may discard as benign series of anomalous combination of memory usage, mem-
ory cached and normal workload, and identify an excessive re-transmission of
network packets jointly with a lack of system service response as symptoms of
a possible packet loss problem in a network node, problem that may cause a
system failure in the long run.
We evaluated PreMiSE on a prototype multi-tier distributed architecture
that implements telecommunication services. The experimental data indicate
that PreMiSE can predict failures and locate faults with high precision and
low false positive rates for some relevant classes of faults, thus confirming our
research hypotheses.
The main contributions of this paper are:
- An approach that combines anomaly- and signature-based techniques to
predict failure occurrences and locate the corresponding faults with high
precision and low false positive rates, by exploiting information collected
from performance indicators in multi-tier distributed systems. The pro-
posed PreMiSE approach can distinguish between anomalous albeit legal
behaviors from erroneous behaviors that can lead to failures, and can
identify the type and location of the causing faults.
- A set of experimental results obtained on a multi-tier distributed sys-
tem that hosts a telecommunication system, which resembles an industrial
telecommunication infrastructure, and which provides evidence of the pre-
cision and accuracy of the approach in the context of cloud systems, a
relevant type of multi-tier distributed systems.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the PreMiSE ap-
proach. Section 3 discusses the offline training of the models. Section 4 presents
the online failure prediction mechanism, based on an original combination of
anomaly- and signature-based techniques. Section 5 illustrates the methodol-
ogy that we followed to evaluate the approach, introduces the evaluation metrics
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and the experimental setting, provides the essential implementation details of
the evaluation infrastructure, and presents both the types of faults injected in
the system and the reference workload used to evaluate the approach. Section 6
discusses the experimental results about the effectiveness and the overhead of
the proposed approach. Section 7 overviews the main related approaches, high-
lighting the original contribution of our approach. Section 8 summarizes the
main contribution of the paper, and indicates the research directions open with
the results documented in this paper.
2. The PreMiSE approach
PreMiSE detects failure symptoms, correlates the detected symptoms to
failure types, and locates the resources responsible of the possible failures which
may occur in the near future.
Several anomalous behaviors of many types can often be observed well in
advance with respect to system failures, which can be frequently mitigated or
avoided, especially in multi-tier distributed systems. For instance in cloud sys-
tems, early observed communication issues can trigger dynamic reallocation of
resources to mitigate or avoid failures. Differently from current approaches,
which simply report anomalous behaviors [21, 24, 20, 19], PreMiSE
- distinguishes anomalous behaviors that are caused by software faults and
that can lead to failures from anomalous behaviors that are derived from
exceptional albeit legal situations and that do not lead to failures, thus re-
ducing the amount of false alarms of current failure prediction approaches,
- correlates anomalous behaviors detected at the system level to specific
types of faults, and predicts not only the occurrence but also the type of
possible failures, thus simplifying the identification of effective corrective
actions, and
- identifies the resources likely responsible for the predicted failure, thus
providing the developers with a useful starting point for investigating and
solving the problem.
As illustrated in Figure 2, PreMiSE is composed of an offline model training
and an online failure prediction phase. As discussed in details in the next sec-
tions, in the offline model training phase, PreMiSE builds baseline and signature
models that capture the system behavior, and in the online failure prediction
phase, PreMiSE uses the baseline and signature models to detect anomalies and
predict failures, respectively.
3. Offline Model Training
In the offline learning phase PreMiSE builds a baseline model and a signa-
ture model. The baseline model identifies anomalous behaviors that might be
5
Figure 2: The PreMiSE learning and predicting phases
interpreted as symptoms of failures, while the signature model associates sets of
anomalous behaviors to either legal albeit spurious behaviors or symptoms of
future failures, and locate the resources likely responsible for the failure.
As illustrated in Figure 2 in the offline learning phase, PreMiSE monitors
series of KPIs over time under normal execution conditions to learn the baseline
model, and seeds faults of the target types to extract the signature model.
The baseline model is a system model and, as such, it is obtained by modeling
only the failure-free behavior, that is, the normal behavior of the system. The
model is used to calculate the expected values, at which the measured current
values are compared to. If the expected and actual values differ significantly,
the system is suspected to not behave as intended. The detection of several
anomalous values is a relevant indicator of failures that may happen in the
future.
In contrast with the baseline model, which focuses on failure-free behaviors,
the generation of the signature model requires training data for both the failure-
prone and failure-free executions. PreMiSE uses the signature model to decide
whether sets of anomalies are due to novel but normal behaviors or specific
classes of failures.
PreMiSE can build the models from different kinds of KPIs, granted that
their values can be monitored as series of values over time, and can train the sig-
nature model with different kinds of seeded faults, granted that the consequent
failures occur after some system degradation over time.
As a simple example, PreMiSE might detect combinations of anomalous
rates of packet re-transmission and aborted operations, by means of the baseline
model. It may then associate these anomalous behaviors to either a transient
situation due to a high and unexpected peak of requests or to a communication
problem that will likely cause a system failure in the future, by means of the
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signature model. It may also identify the subsystems likely responsible for
the incoming communication problems, from the information provided with the
detected violations patterns.
While model incompleteness is both possible and probable, this can be com-
pensated by incrementally collecting additional evidence about the behavior of
the system. For instance, the baseline model can be improved incrementally
and the signature model can be retrained regularly.
3.1. KPI Monitor
PreMiSE collects an extensive number of KPIs from different tiers of many
system components without interfering with the system behavior by relying on
lightweight monitoring infrastructures, often natively available at the different
levels [25, 26], and elaborates the collected data on an independent node that
executes the data processing routines. In this way PreMiSE affects the moni-
tored nodes only with the negligible costs of collecting data, and not with the
relevant costs of the computation, which is relegated to an independent node.
The empirical results reported in Section 6 confirm the non-intrusiveness of the
monitoring infrastructure.
The values monitored for each KPI are time series data, that is, sequences
of numeric values, each associated with a timestamp and a resource of the
monitored system. Table 1 reports a sample excerpt of the time series data for
the KPI BytesSentPerSec collected from a resource named Homer1. Columns
Timestamp, Resource and BytesSentPerSec indicate the time information, the
name of the resource that produced the KPI value, and the number of bytes
sent in the last second, respectively.
In the context of this paper, KPIs are metrics measured on specific resources.
More formally, a KPI is a pair < resource,metric >. For example, BytesSent-
PerSec collected at Homer is a KPI, and the same metric collected at another
resource is a different KPI. Thus, the number of collected KPIs depends on the
product of monitored metrics and resources.
PreMiSE can be customized with different sets of KPIs, collected at het-
erogeneous levels. The selection of KPIs depends on the characteristics of the
target system, and impacts on the type of failures that PreMiSE can detect:
PreMiSE can detect only failures whose occurrence follows some anomalous
behaviors that reflect in anomalies in the series of KPIs monitored over time.
We experimented with over 600 KPIs of over 90 different types, collected KPIs
at different abstraction levels, ranging from the Linux operating system to the
Clearwater application level, and predicted failures of different types, ranging
from network to memory failures. We discuss the experimental setting and the
results in details in Section 5.3.
1Resource Homer is one of the virtual machines used in our empirical setting, a protoype
of a cloud infrastructure used by telecommunication companies to provide SIP services, as
described in Section 5.3. Resource Homer is a standard XML Document Management Server
that stores MMTEL (MultiMedia TELephony) service settings of the users.
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Table 1: Sample time series for KPI BytesSentPerSec collected at node Homer
Timestamp Resource BytesSentPerSec
. . . . . . . . .
Dec. 20, 2016 22:22:35 Homer 101376
Dec. 20, 2016 22:23:36 Homer 121580
Dec. 20, 2016 22:24:36 Homer 124662
Dec. 20, 2016 22:25:36 Homer 106854
. . . . . . . . .
3.2. Baseline Model Learner
The baseline model learner derives the baseline model from series of KPIs
collected under normal system executions, and thus represents correct system
behaviors. The baseline model learner generates models with inference solutions
that capture temporal relationships in time series data, by including trends and
seasonalities [27]. In particular, the baseline model learner applies Granger
causality tests [28] to determine wether a time series variable can predict the
evolution of another variable.
A time series x is said to be a Granger cause of a time series y, if and only if
the regression analysis of y based on past values of both y and x is statistically
more accurate than the regression analysis of y based on past values of y only.
The ability of Granger causality analysis to analyze the dependency between
KPIs is a key factor for improving the accuracy of the analysis, because many
KPIs are correlated. For instance the CPU load often depends on the rate of
incoming requests, and several phenomena could be fully interpreted only by
considering multiple time series jointly. For instance, a high CPU load might be
anomalous or not depending on the rate of incoming requests that are received
by the system.
The PreMiSE baseline model includes both models for the single KPIs and
models of the correlation among KPIs. Figure 3 illustrates a baseline model
of a single KPI, namely the model inferred for KPI BytesSentPerSec collected
from the Homer virtual machine. The figure indicates the average value of
the time series (dark blue line) and the confidence interval for new samples
(light green area around the line). Figure 4 shows an excerpt of a Granger
causality graph that represents the causal dependencies among KPIs. Causal
dependencies indicate the strength of the correlation between pairs of KPIs, that
is, the extent to which changes of one KPI are related to changes of another
KPI. Nodes in the causality graph correspond to KPIs, and weighted edges
indicate the causal relationships among KPIs, as a value in the interval [0, 1],
indicating the increasing strength of the correlation. In the example, the values
of BytesSentPerSec metric in node Homer are strongly correlated to and can
thus be used to predict values of Sscpuidle metric in node Homer.
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Figure 3: A sample baseline model of a single KPI: The BytesSentPerSec KPI for the Homer
virtual machine
Figure 4: A baseline model of the correlation among KPIs: an excerpt from a Granger causality
graph
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3.3. Fault Seeder
The baseline model captures both the shape of the KPI values over time
for single KPIs and the correlation among KPIs under normal execution con-
ditions. The signature model captures the relations among anomalous KPIs
observed both during normal execution conditions and with seeded faults. The
Signature Model Extractor can be trained with different types of seeded faults,
whose consequent failures occur after some system degradation over time. Being
trained with seeded faults, the signature model can build patterns of anoma-
lies related to failures, and thus distinguish between benign and failure-prone
anomalies when monitoring the system execution. The Fault seeder injects a
fault of a given type in a system location for each system run. PreMiSE can
accurately predict failures and locate faults of the types of faults injected in the
training phase. Following common practice, we chose the faults to inject accord-
ing to the Pareto distribution of the frequency and severity of the fault types.
The signature model can be extended incrementally to new types of faults.
3.4. Signature Model Extractor
The Signature model extractor derives the signature model from a sam-
ple set of anomalous behaviors that correspond to correct as well as faulty
executions. The Signature model extractor learns the model from anomalies
identified by the Anomaly Detector2. Anomalies are tuples 〈(a1, . . . , an), f, r〉,
where (a1, . . . , an) is a (possibly empty) sequence of anomalous KPIs that are
detected during an execution window of a fixed length, f is a failure type,
and r is the resource responsible for the failure. Thus, anomalous KPIs are
KPIs without time stamp, and indicate that the KPIs assume anomalous val-
ues for at least a time stamp within the considered window. For instance, the
tuple 〈(〈BytesReceivedPerSec,Homer〉, 〈Sprouthomerlatencyhwm,Sprout〉,
〈Sscpuidle, Sprout〉), Packetloss, Sprout〉 indicates three correlated KPIs that
assume anomalous values in the considered execution window, and signals a
predicted packet loss failure in node Sprout with a likelihood encoded in the
tuple 〈30, 1〉, as discussed after in this section.
Both f and r are empty when the execution window corresponds to a normal
execution with no active faults. In the training phase PreMiSE seeds at most
a fault per execution window, and considers execution windows that originate
with the activation of the fault and slide through the faulty execution up to
a maximum size, and thus collects anomalies that occur immediately after the
fault activation as well as along a possibly long lasting failing execution. We
discuss the tuning of the size of the sliding window in Section 6.
PreMiSE records both the type of the failure and the resource seeded with
the fault to learn signatures that can predict the failure type and locate the
responsible resource. The Signature Model Extractor relies on several faults
2We discuss the Anomaly Detector in details in Section 4 reveals during the training phase,
by relying on the baseline model and faulty execution traces.
10
for each type, seeded in different locations, and uses multi-label probabilistic
classifiers as signature extractors.
Probabilistic classifiers generate probability distributions over sets of class
labels from given sets of samples. PreMiSE uses the probability distributions
to compute the confidence of the predictions, thus producing a signature model
that the Failure predictor can exploit to predict both the type of the failure and
the location of the resources that are most likely responsible for the failure, and
to compute the confidence on the prediction. We empirically investigated sig-
nature extractors based on Support Vector Machine (SVM), Bayesian Network
(BN), Best-First Decision Tree (BFDT), Na¨ıve Bayes (NB), Decision Table
(DT)), Logistic Model Tree (LMT) and Hidden Na¨ıve Bayes (HNB) algorithms.
We introduce the algorithms in Section 5.3, and discuss their experimental eval-
uation in Section 6.
As an example of signature model, Figure 5 shows an excerpt of a decision
tree that PreMiSE inferred for packet loss failures3. Nodes correspond to KPIs
and edges indicate the anomaly relation. Leaf nodes are annotated with the
confidence level of the prediction indicates as pairs 〈total, correct〉, where total
is the amount of samples that reach the node, and correct is the amount of
samples that are correctly classified according to the leaf, that is, the number
of samples corresponding to failed executions of the specific type caused by the
specific resource, as indicated in the model. The ratio between correct and total
indicates the likelihood of the prediction to be correct.
The model indicates that anomalous values of BytesReceivedPerSec in node
Homer are a symptom of a possible packet loss failure in node Homer, that a
combination of non-anomalous values of BytesReceivedPerSec in node Homer
with anomalous values of Sscpuidle in node Sprout are a symptom of a pos-
sible packet loss failure in node Sprout, and that the likelihood of a failure
increases when both BytesReceivedPerSec in Homer and Sscpuidle in Sprout
are anomalous. This may happen because packet loss problems may cause a
drop in the number of accesses to the user service settings stored in the Homer
XDMS server, since a packet loss problem may decrease the frequency of au-
thentication requests received by Sprout and thus increasing the CPU idle time.
The branches of the decision tree not reported in the figure indicate additional
relationship between symptoms and failures.
4. Online Failure Prediction
In the online failure prediction phase, PreMiSE uses the baseline model to
detect anomalies and the signature model to predict failures.
3We experimented with different models. Here we report a signature in the form of a
decision tree because decision trees are easier to visualise and discuss than other models.
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Figure 5: A sample signature model based on decision trees
4.1. Anomaly Detector
Anomalies are behaviors that differ from the expectations, and are thus
suspicious. The baseline model encodes expected behavior as a collection of time
series of single KPIs and as the Granger correlation among KPIs, as illustrated
in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. The Anomaly Detector signals univariate and
multivariate anomalies when the values of the collected or correlated KPIs differ
enough from the baseline model. Univariate anomalies depend on single KPIs,
while multivariate anomalies depend on the combination of more than one KPI,
each of which may or may not be identified as anomalous by the univariate
analysis.
The Anomaly Detector detects univariate anomalies as samples out of range,
as shown in Figure 6. Given an observed value yt of a time series y at time t,
and the corresponding expected value yˆt in y, yt is anomalous if the variance
σˆ2(yt, yˆt) is above an inferred threshold.
The Anomaly Detector detects multivariate anomalies as joint unexpected
values of subsets of samples for different variables. It deduces multivariate
anomalies among the KPI variables when their relation violates the Granger
correlation encoded in the Granger causality graph. For example, it can in-
fer that successful call rate and number of incoming calls are correlated: the
successful call rate usually decreases with an increasing number of incoming
calls, and thus the anomaly detector may signal a multivariate anomaly in the
presence of a decreasing successful call rate without a corresponding increase
of number of incoming calls, regardless of the results of the univariate analysis
of two values. The Anomaly Detector identifies multivariate anomalies with
the Granger causality test that checks if a set of correlated KPIs preserves the
inferred casual relationships.
4.2. Failure Predictor
The Failure Predictor identifies possible failures as sets of anomalies that
find a matching in the signature model.
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Figure 6: A sample univariate anomalous behavior
As discussed in Section 3.4, PreMiSE trains the signature model with sets of
anomalies detected during execution windows of fixed size in terms of anomalous
KPI samples. The PreMiSE failure predictor analyzes the sets of anomalies de-
tected in a sliding windows of the same size of the windows used during training.
For instance, the Failure Predictor can predict an incoming packet loss failure in
the presence of an anomalous value of Sscpuidle (idle time for the authentication
service) in node Sprout when occurring with a normal value of BytesReceivePer-
Sec (number of received requests) in the Homer XDMS server, based on the
signature model shown in Figure 5. In fact, the sequence 〈〈BytesReceivePerSec
in Homer, not anomalous〉, 〈Sscpuidle in Sprout, anomalous〉〉 in Figure 5 leads
to Likely Packet Loss Failure in Sprout
PreMiSE generates both general and failure-specific alerts that correspond
to generic failure-prone behaviors and specific failures, respectively. Follow-
ing common practice in failure prediction solutions that focus their capability
to make prediction on recent observations [15], PreMiSE collects anomalies in
overlapping windows sliding over time. Anomalies first occur in the sliding win-
dow that includes the first occurrence of the anomalous KPI, and persist in the
following windows, until the anomaly falls out of the windows themselves.
Right after injecting a fault, sliding windows include mostly anomalies pro-
duced during the previous failure-free execution segments and only few anoma-
lies caused by the injected fault, while forward moving sliding windows include
increasingly many anomalies caused by the activated fault. When sliding win-
dows includes only a small portion of anomalies, the prediction might be impre-
cise. The Failure Predictor refines the predicted failure type over time, until the
prediction stabilizes. The Failure Predictor copes with this transitory phase by
refining an initially general prediction into a failure-specific prediction once the
prediction stabilizes, that is, it predicts the same failure type with a confidence
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level of at least 90% for 4 consecutive times.
In the training phase, PreMiSE builds signature models starting with data
collected just after activating the injected fault, and thus the signature model
encodes early predictors, that is, sets of anomalies that occur as early as the
fault is activated, often long before the consequent failure. This strategy al-
lows PreMiSE to quickly refine a general into a failure-specific prediction, as
confirmed by the experimental results reported in Section 6.
The predictions indicates the type of expected failure and the set of anoma-
lous KPIs that substantiate the prediction. PreMiSE uses the information about
the anomalous KPIs to localize the source of the problem, which might be a re-
source different from the resources responsible for the anomalous KPIs. For
instance in our experiments, PreMiSE correctly predicted a packet loss failure
in a specific virtual machine by analyzing a set of 37 anomalous KPIs generated
by 14 different resources. This is a good example of the importance of locating
the fault given a large set of resources involved in the anomalous samples.
5. Evaluation Methodology
In this section, we introduce the research questions (Section 5.1), the testbed
that implements a realistic telecom cloud-based system (Section 5.2), the pro-
totype implementation that we used in the experiments (Section 5.3), the fault
seeding strategy that we adopted to collect data about failures caused by dif-
ferent types of faults (Section 5.4), the workflow that we simulated in the ex-
periments (Section 5.5) and the quality measures that we used to evaluate the
results (Section 5.6).
5.1. Research Questions
We address six research questions that evaluate the effectiveness of PreMiSE ,
compare PreMiSE with state of the art approaches and quantify the PreMiSE over-
head.
Effectiveness
To evaluate the capability of PreMiSE to successfully predict failures in a
realistic cloud-based system we investigate four research questions:
RQ1 Does the size of the sliding window impact on the effectiveness of PreMiSE ?
We executed PreMiSE with different window sizes, and measured the im-
pact of the window size on the ability to correctly predict failures. We
used the results of this experiment to identify an appropriate window size
that we used in the other experiments.
RQ2 Can PreMiSE accurately predict failures and localize faults? We executed
PreMiSE with different failure types and failure patterns, and measured
its ability to predict failures occurrence, types and locations. We exper-
imented with several multi-label mining algorithms, and compare their
performance and effectiveness in predicting failures. We used the most
effective algorithm in the other experiments.
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RQ3 Can PreMiSE correctly identify normal behaviors not experienced in the
past? We executed PreMiSE with workflows that differ significantly from
the workflow used in the training phase and measured its ability to classify
these executions as normal executions.
RQ4 How early can PreMiSE predict a failure? We executed a number of
experiments to determine how early PreMiSE can predict failure occur-
rences, for different types of failures.
RQ1 is intended to analyze the sensitivity of failure prediction and fault
localization to changes in the window parameter. RQ2 focuses on the effec-
tiveness of PreMiSE mainly in case of faulty executions, while RQ3 studies
PreMiSE with perturbed workloads under normal conditions to study the false
positive rate. RQ4 investigates prediction time in faulty executions.
Comparison to state-of-the-art approaches
[R2.1]We compare PreMiSE with IBM OA-PI — Operational Analytics -
Predictive Insights [22], an industrial anomaly-based approach, and with the
Grey-Box Detection Approach (G-BDA) of Sauvanaud et al. [22], a state-of-
the-art signature-based approach. We discuss the following research question:
RQ5 Can PreMiSE predict failures more accurately than state-of-the-art ap-
proaches? We compare PreMiSE to OA-PI and G-BDA by executing all
approaches on the same set of normal and failing executions, and compar-
ing their ability to predict failures. Since OA-PI cannot predict the type
of failure and locate the corresponding fault, we only evaluated its ability
to predict failure occurrences.
Overhead
We investigated the impact of PreMiSE on the overall performance of a
cloud-based system by addressing the following research question:
RQ6 What is the overhead of PreMiSE on the performance of the target sys-
tem? This question is particularly relevant in the context of multi-tier
distributed systems with strict performance requirements, like telecom-
munication infrastructures. Thus, we designed an experiment referring to
such applications. PreMiSE executes the resource-intensive tasks, that is,
anomaly detection and failure prediction, on a dedicated physical server,
and thus the overhead on the system derives only from monitoring the
KPIs.
We evaluated the impact of monitoring the KPIs on the system perfor-
mance by measuring the consumption of the different resources when run-
ning the system with and without KPI monitoring active. Both PreMiSE
and data analytics solutions monitor the same KPIs, and thus share the
same performance overhead, but PreMiSE further processes the anoma-
lies revealed with data analytics approaches, and presents more accurate
predictions than competing approaches.
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5.2. Testbed
As representative case of multi-tier distributed system, we considered the
case of a complete cloud-based environment running an industrial-level IP mul-
timedia sub-system. To control the study, we created a private cloud consisting
of (i) a controller node responsible for running the management services neces-
sary for the virtualization infrastructure, (ii) six compute nodes that run VM
instances, (iii) a network node responsible for network communication among
virtual machines. The characteristics of the different nodes are summarized in
Table 2.
Table 2: Hardware configuration
Host Controller Network Compute (x2) Compute (x4)
CPU
Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Quad CPU Q9650
(12M Cache, 3.00 GHz, 1333 MHz FSB)
RAM 4 GB 4 GB 8 GB 4 GB
Disk 250 GB SATA hard disk
NIC Intel(R) 82545EM Gigabit Ethernet Controller
We used OpenStack [29] version Icehouse on Ubuntu 14.04 LTS as open
source cloud operating system and KVM [30] as hypervisor.
To evaluate our approach, we deployed Clearwater [31] on the cloud-based in-
frastructure. Clearwater is an open source IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) and
provides IP-based voice, video and message services. Clearwater is specifically
designed to massively scale on a cloud-based infrastructure, and is a product
originated from the current trend of migrating traditional network functions
from inflexible and expensive hardware appliances to cloud-based software so-
lutions. Our Clearwater deployment consists of the following virtual machines:
Bono: the entry point for all clients communication in the Clearwater system.
Sprout: the handler of client authentications and registrations.
Homestead: a Web service interface to Sprout for retrieving authentication
credentials and user profile information.
Homer: a standard XML Document Management Server that stores MMTEL
(MultiMedia Telephony) service settings for each user.
Ralf: a service for offline billing capabilities.
Ellis: a service for self sign-up, password management, line management and
control of multimedia telephony service settings.
Each component is running on a different VM. Each VM is configured with
2 vCPU, 2GB of RAM and 20GB hard disk space, and runs the Ubuntu 12.04.5
LTS operating system.
Our multi-tier distributed system is thus composed of eight machines running
components from three tiers: the operating system, infrastructure and applica-
tion tiers, running Linux, OpenStack, and virtual machines with Clearwater,
respectively. We refer to this environment as the testbed.
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5.3. Prototype Implementation
Our prototype implementation of the monitoring infrastructure collects a to-
tal of 633 KPIs of 96 different types from the 14 physical and virtual machines
that comprise the protoype. We collected KPIs at three levels: 162 KPIs at the
application level with the SNMPv2c (Simple Network Management Protocol)
monitoring service for Clearwater [25], 121 KPIs at the IaaS level with the Open-
Stack telemetry service (Ceilometer) for OpenStack [26] and 350 KPIs at the
operating system level with a Linux OS agent that we implemented for Ubuntu.
We selected the KPIs referring to the multi-tired distributed nature of our pro-
totype and the low-impact requirements that characterize most industrial scale
systems. We collected KPIs from all the tiers characterizing the system, by re-
lying on already available services, when possible, and on ad-hoc build monitors
otherwise. We collected only KPIs that can be monitored with no functional
impact and negligible performance overhead. As expected, PreMiSE did not
impose any limitation on the set of collected and processed KPIs, and we ex-
pect this to be valid in general. Studying the impact of noisy and redundant
KPIs on the performance of PreMiSE may further improve the technique.
At the application tier, PreMiSE collects both standard SNMP KPIs, such as
communication latency between virtual machines, and Clearwater specific KPIs,
such as the number of rejected IP-voice calls. At the IaaS tier, PreMiSE col-
lects KPIs about the cloud resource usage, such as the rate of read and write
operations executed by OpenStack. At the operating system tier, PreMiSE col-
lects KPIs about the usage of the physical resources, such as consumption of
computational, storage, and network resources. In our evaluation, we used a
sampling rate of 60 seconds.
PreMiSE elaborates KPIs from both simple and aggregated metrics, that is,
metrics that can be sampled directly, such as CPU usage, and metrics derived
from multiple simple metrics, for example the call success rate, which can be
derived from the number of total and successful calls, respectively. The KPI
Monitor sends the data collected at each node to the predictor node that runs
PreMiSE on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server release 6.3 with Intel(R) Core
(TM) 2 Quad Q9650 processor at 3GHz frequency and 16GB RAM.
We implemented the Baseline Model Learner and the Anomaly Detector
on release 1.3 of OA-PI [22], a state-of-the-art tool that computes the corre-
lation between pairs of KPIs. OA-PI detects anomalies by implementing the
following anomaly detection criteria: normal baseline variance, normal-to-flat
variation, variance reduction, Granger causality, unexpected level, out-of-range
values, rare values4, and issues alarms after revealing anomalies in few consecu-
tive samples. OA-PI can analyze large volumes of data in real-time (the official
IBM documentation show an example server configuration to manage 1, 000, 000
KPIs)5, and thus enables PreMiSE to deal with the amount of KPIs that char-
4https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SSJQQ3_1.3.3/com.ibm.scapi.doc/
intro/r_oapi_adminguide_algorithms.html
5https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/SSJQQ3_1.3.3/com.ibm.scapi.
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acterise large-scale distributed systems. The OP-PI learning phase requires data
from at least two weeks of normal operation behaviors, thus determining the
PreMiSE two weeks training interval.
We implemented the Signature Model Extractor and the Failure Predictor
on top of the Weka library [32], a widely used open-source library that supports
several classic machine learning algorithms. We empirically compared the ef-
fectiveness of seven popular algorithms for solving classification problems when
used to generate signatures:
• a function-based Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithm that imple-
ments a sequential minimal optimization [33],
• a Bayesian Network (BN) algorithm based on hill climbing [34],
• a best-first Best-First Decision Tree (BFDT) algorithm that builds a de-
cision tree using a best-first search strategy [35],
• a Na¨ıve Bayes (NB) algorithm that implements a simple form of Bayesian
network that assumes that the predictive attributes are conditionally inde-
pendent, and that no hidden or latent attributes influence the prediction
process [36],
• a Decision Table (DT)) algorithm based on a decision table format that
may include multiple exact condition matches for a data item, computing
the result by a majority vote [37],
• a Logistic Model Tree (LMT) algorithm that combines linear logistic re-
gression and tree induction [38],
• a Hidden Na¨ıve Bayes (HNB) algorithm that uses the mutual information
attribute weighted method to weight one-dependence estimators [39].
As discussed in Section 6 and illustrated in Table 5, the results of our evalu-
ation do not indicate major differences among the considered algorithms, with
a slightly better performance of Logistic Model Trees that we adopt in the ex-
periments.
5.4. Fault Seeding
In this section, we discuss the methodology that we followed to seed faults in
the testbed. Fault seeding consists of introducing faults in a system to reproduce
the effects of real faults, and is a common approach to evaluate the dependability
of systems and study the effectiveness of fault-tolerance mechanisms [40, 41] in
test or production environments [18, 42].
Since we use a cloud-based system to evaluate PreMiSE, we identify a set
of faults that are well representative of the problems that affect cloud-based
doc/intro/c_tasp_intro_deploymentscenarios.html
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applications. We analyze a set of issue reports6 of some relevant cloud projects
to determine the most relevant fault types that threat Cloud applications. We
analyze a total of 106 issue reports, 18 about KVM7, 62 about OpenStack8,
19 about CloudFoundry9, and 7 about Amazon10, and we informally assess
the results with our industrial partners that operate in the telecommunication
infrastructure domain.
We classify the analyzed faults in thirteen main categories. Figure 7 plots
the percentage of faults per category in decreasing order of occurrence for the
analyzed fault repositories. The figure indicates a gap between the three more
frequent and the other categories of faults, and we thus experimented with
the three most frequent categories: Network, Resource leaks and High overhead
faults. Network faults consist of networking issues that typically affect the
network and transport layers, such as packet loss problems. Resource leaks
occur when resources that should be available for executing the system are not
obtainable, for instance because a faulty process does not release memory when
not needed any more. High overhead faults occur when a system component
cannot meet its overall objectives due to inadequate performance, for instance
because of poorly implemented APIs or resource-intensive activities.
Based on the results of this analysis, we evaluate PreMiSE with injected
faults of six types, that characterize the three top ranked categories of faults
in Figure 7: Network faults that depend on Packet Loss due to Hardware and
Excessive workload conditions, increased Packet Latency due to network delay
and Packet corruption due to errors in packet transmission and reception, Re-
source leak faults that depend on Memory Leaks, and High overhead faults that
depend on CPU Hogs. In details, (i) A packet loss due to hardware conditions
drops a fraction of the network packets, and simulates the degradation of the
cloud network; (ii) A packet loss due to excessive workload conditions corre-
sponds to an extremely intensive workload, and causes an intensive packet loss;
(iii) An increased packet latency and (iv) corruption due to channel noise, rout-
ing anomalies or path failures, simulates degraded packet delivery performances;
(v) A memory leak fault periodically allocates some memory without releasing
it, simulates a common software bug, which severely threaten the dependability
of cloud systems; (vi) A CPU Hog fault executes some CPU intensive processes
that consume most of the CPU time and cause poor system performance.
We limited our investigation to the most relevant categories of faults to
control the size of the experiment, which already involves an extremely large
number of executions. The results that we discuss in Section 6 demonstrate the
effectiveness of PreMiSE across all the faults considered in the experiments. We
expect comparable results for other fault categories with the same characteristics
6We conducted the analysis in July 2014 selecting the most recent issue reports at the time
of the inspection.
7https://bugzilla.kernel.org/buglist.cgi?component=kvm
8https://bugs.launchpad.net/openstack
9https://www.pivotaltracker.com/n/projects/956238
10http://aws.amazon.com
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Figure 7: Occurrences of categories of faults in the analyzed repositories
of the considered ones, namely faults that lead to the degradation of some KPI
values over time before a failure. This is the case of most of the fault categories
of Figure 7, with the exception of host and guest crashes, which may sometime
occur suddenly and without an observable degradation of KPI values over time.
Confirming this hypothesis and thus extending the results to a broader range
of fault categories would require additional experiments.
We inject packet loss, packet latency, packet corruption, memory leaks and
CPU Hogs faults into both the host (Openstack) and guest (Clearwater) lay-
ers, and excessive workload faults by altering the nature of the workload, fol-
lowing the approaches proposed in previous studies on dependability of cloud
systems [40] and on problem determination in dynamic clouds [41].
We study a wide range of situations by injecting faults according to three
activation patterns:
Constant: the fault is triggered with a same frequency over time.
Exponential: the fault is activated with a frequency that increases exponen-
tially, resulting in a shorter time to failure.
Random: the fault is activated randomly over time.
Overall, we seeded 12 faults in different hosts and VMs. Each fault is char-
acterized by a fault type and an activation pattern.
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5.5. Workload Characteristics
In practice, it is hard to know if a set of executions is general enough. In our
specific settings, we define the workload used in the experimental evaluation to
replicate the shape of real SIP traffic as experienced by our industrial partners
in the telecommunication domain. We carefully tuned the peak of the workflow
to use as much as 80% of CPU and memory. We generate the SIP traffic with
the SIPp traffic generator [43], which is an open source initiative from Hewlett-
Packard (HP) and is the de facto standard for SIP performance benchmarking.
SIPp can simulate the generation of multiple calls using a single machine.
The generated calls follow user-defined scenarios that include the exact defini-
tion of both the SIP dialog and the structure of the individual SIP messages. In
our evaluation, we use the main SIP call flow dialogs as documented in Clear-
water11.
Figure 8: Plot with calls per second generated by our workload over a week
Our workload includes a certain degree of randomness, and generates new
calls based on a call rate that changes according to calendar patterns. In par-
ticular, we consider two workload patterns:
Daily variations The system is busier on certain days of the week. In particu-
lar, we consider a higher traffic in working days (Monday through Friday)
and lower traffic in the weekend days (Saturday and Sunday). Figure 8
graphically illustrates the structure of our workload over a period of a
week.
11http://www.projectclearwater.org/technical/call-flows/
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Hourly variations To resemble daily usage patterns, our workload is lighter
during the night and heavier during the day with two peaks at 9am and
7pm, as graphically illustrated in Figure 9.
In our empirical evaluation, we obtained good results already with the work-
load that we designed, without the need of introducing extensive variability in
the normal executions used for training. This is probably a positive side effect
of the usage of anomaly detection and failure prediction in a pipeline. In fact,
the failure predictor component can compensate the noise and false positives
produced by anomaly detector.
Figure 9: Plot with calls per second generated by our workload over a day
5.6. Evaluation Measures
We addressed the research questions RQ1, RQ2 and RQ5 by using 10-fold
cross-validation [44]. PreMiSE analyzes time series data, and collects anomalous
KPIs every 5 minutes, to comply with the requirements of IBM OA-PI [22],
the time series analyzer used in PreMiSE . Signature-base analysis does not
consider the order in which the sliding windows are arranged, thus we collected
the samples necessary to apply 10-fold cross validation during the execution of
our workload with sliding windows of length l. Since each run lasts 120 minutes
and the size of the interval in the sliding window is 5 minutes, each workload
execution produces (120− l)/5 samples that can be used for prediction. In the
evaluation, we first studied the impact of l on the results (RQ1), and then used
the best value in our contest for the other experiments.
Overall we collected samples from a total of 648 runs, which include 24
passing executions and 24 failing executions for each type of failure. A failing
execution is characterized by a fault of a given type injected in a given resource
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with a given activation pattern. As discussed in Section 5.4, we injected faults
of six different types (packet loss, excessive workload, packet latency, packet
corruption, memory leak and cpu hog) following three activation patterns (con-
stant, exponential and random). For all but excessive workload, we injected
faults on five different target resources (the Bono, Sprout, and Homestead vir-
tual machines in Clearwater and two compute nodes in OpenStack), resulting
in 5× 3× 5 = 75 failure cases. For excessive workload, we injected faults with
three patterns with no specific target resource, since excessive workload faults
target the system and not a specific resource. We thus obtained 75 + 3 = 78
failure cases. To avoid biases due to the fault injection pattern, we repeated
every experiment 8 times, thus obtaining 624 failing executions for the evalua-
tion. The extensive investigation of the different fault types, activation patterns,
and affected resources made the set of executions available for the experiment
unbalanced between passing executions (24 cases) and failing executions (624
cases).
Since we use l = 90 for RQ2 and RQ5, we obtained a total of 4,782 samples
collected from both passing and failing executions. The number of samples
available for RQ1 is higher because we tried different values for l. To apply
10-fold cross-validation, we split the set of samples into 10 sets of equals size,
using nine of them to learn the prediction model and the remaining set to
compute the quality of the model. The PreMiSE failure prediction algorithm
does not consider the order of the samples in time, since it classifies each sample
independently from the others.
We evaluated the quality of a prediction model using the standard measures
that are used to define contingency tables and that cover the four possible
outcomes of failure prediction (see Table 3). We also measured the following
derived metrics:
Precision: the ratio of correctly predicted failures over all predicted failures.
This measure can be used to assess the rate of false alarms, and thus
the rate of unnecessary reactions that might be triggered by the failure
predictor.
Recall: the ratio of correctly predicted failures over actual failures. This mea-
sure can be used to assess the percentage of failures that can be predicted
with the failure predictor.
F-Measure: the uniformly weighted harmonic mean of precision and recall.
This measure captures with a single number the tradeoff between precision
and recall.
Accuracy: the ratio of correct predictions over the total number of predictions.
The accuracy provides a quantitative measure of the capability to predict
both failures and correct executions.
FPR (False Positive Rate): the ratio of incorrectly predicted failures to the
number of all correct executions. The FPR provides a measure of the false
warning frequency.
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Table 4 summarizes the derived metrics that we used by presenting their
mathematical formulas and meanings.
Table 3: Contingency table
Predicted
Failure Not-Failure
Actual
Failure
True Positive (TP)
(correct warning)
False Negative (FN)
(missed warning)
Not-failure
False Positive (FP)
(false warning)
True Negative (TN)
(correct no-warning)
Table 4: Selected metrics obtained from the contingency table
Metric Formula Meaning
How many predicted
Precision TP(TP+FP ) failures are actual
failures?
How many actual
Recall TP(TP+FN) failures are correctly
predicted as failures?
Harmonic mean of
F-measure 2 ∗ (Precision∗Recall)(Precision+Recall) Precision and Recall
How many predictions
Accuracy (TP+TN)(TP+TN+FP+FN) are correct?
How many correct
FPR (FP )(TN+FP ) executions are
predicted as failures?
We addressed the research question RQ3 by computing the percentage of
samples that PreMiSE correctly classifies as failure-free given a set of sam-
ples collected by running workflows that differ significantly from the workflow
used during the training phase. To this end, we designed two new workflows:
random40 and random100. The random40 workflow behaves like the training
workflow with a uniformly random deviation between 0% to 40%, while the
random100 workflow behaves with a deviation of up to 100%.
We addressed the research question RQ4 by computing the time needed to
generate a prediction and the time between a failure prediction and its occurrence
from a total of 18 faulty runs lasting up to twelve hours. The former time
measures the capability of PreMiSE to identify and report erroneous behaviors.
The latter time estimates how early PreMiSE can predict failure occurrences.
As shown in Figure 10, we define four specific measures:
Time-To-General-Prediction (TTGP): the distance between the time a
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Figure 10: Prediction time measures
fault is active for the first time and the time PreMiSE produces a general
prediction,
Time-To-Failure-Specific-Prediction (TTFSP): the distance between the
time a fault is active for the first time and the time PreMiSE predicts a
specific failure type,
Time-To-Failure for General Prediction (TTF(GP)): the distance between
the time PreMiSE predicts a general failure and the time the failure hap-
pens,
Time-To-Failure for Failure-Specific Prediction (TTF(FSP)): the dis-
tance between the time PreMiSE predicts a specific failure type and the
time the system fails,
where the Fault occurrence is the time the seeded fault becomes active in the
system, the General prediction is the first time PreMiSE signals the presence of
a failure without indicating the fault yet, that is, it identifies an anomaly with
an empty fault and resource, the Failure-specific prediction is the first time
PreMiSE indicates also the fault type and the faulty resource, the Failure is the
time the delivered service deviated from the system function. Failures depend
on the seeded faults. In our case, failures manifest either as system crashes or
as success rate dropping below 60%, as indicated in Section 6 when discussing
RQ4.
To answer RQ6, we measured the resource consumption as (i) the percentage
of CPU used by the monitoring activities, (ii) the amount of memory used by
the monitoring activities, (iii) the amount of bytes read/written per second by
the monitoring activities, and (iv) the packets received/sent per second over the
network interfaces by the monitoring activities.
6. Experimental Results
In this section we discuss the results of the experiments that we executed to
answer the research questions that we introduced in the former section.
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Table 5: Comparative evaluation of the effectiveness of PreMiSE prediction and localization
with the different algorithms for generating signatures
Model Precision Recall F-measure Accuracy FPR
BN 84.906 82.438 82.430 82.438 0.685
BFDT 97.746 97.719 97.726 97.719 0.093
NB 83.931 80.925 80.786 80.925 0.745
SVM 98.632 98.632 98.632 98.632 0.057
DT 92.650 88.555 89.943 88.555 0.470
LMT 98.798 98.797 98.797 98.797 0.050
HNB 92.307 91.831 91.765 91.831 0.325
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RQ1: Sliding window size
PreMiSE builds the prediction models and analyses anomalies referring to
time sliding windows of fixed size. The sliding windows should be big enough to
contain a sufficient amount of information to predict failures and small enough
to be practical and sensitive to failure symptoms.
With this first set of experiments, we investigate the impact of the window
size on the effectiveness of the prediction. We experimented with the seven
algorithms described in Section 5.3, each with sliding windows of size 60, 90
and 120 minutes to study the impact of the window size, and to chose the
size for the next experiments. We built a total of 27 prediction models. We
executed the prototype tool with the different prediction models both with and
without seeded faults, for a total of 24 execution for 27 configurations, 26 of
which corresponding to configurations each seeded with a different fault, and
one no-faulty configuration, for a total of 648 executions. The configurations
correspond to the raw of Table 6 that we discuss later in this section.
Figure 11 compares the average precision, recall, F-measure and accuracy
over all the experiments. These results indicate that the window size has a mod-
erate impact on the predictions, and that a window size of 90 minutes reaches
the best prediction effectiveness among the experimented sizes. Figure 12 shows
the average false positive rates for the different window sizes, and confirms the
choice of a window of 90 minutes as the optimal choice among the evaluated
sizes. The results collected for the individual algorithms are consistent with the
average ones. In all the remaining experiments, we use 90-minutes windows.
RQ2: Predicting Failures and locating faults
We evaluated the effectiveness of PreMiSE as the ability of predicting in-
coming failures and identifying the kind and location of the related faults.
Table 5 shows the precision, recall, F-measure, accuracy and False Posi-
tive Rate (FPR) of failure prediction and fault localization for PreMiSE with
the prediction algorithms presented at the end of Section 5.3. The table indi-
cates that PreMiSE performs well with all the algorithms, with slightly better
indicators for LMTs (Logistic Model Trees) that we select for the remaining
experiments.
Table 6 shows the effectiveness of PreMiSE with LMT for the different fault
types and locations. The metrics were calculated on a window basis as you need
to make a forecast about each window. This means that windows that belong
to both failed and correct executions are taken into account. The results in
the table indicate that the approach is extremely accurate: PreMiSE suffered
from only 74 false predictions out of 4,782 window samples. PreMiSE can
quickly complete the offline training phase. To learn the baseline model, the
data collected from two weeks of execution required less than 90 minutes of
processing time. When the training phase runs in parallel to the data collection
process, it completes almost immediately after the data collection process has
finished. The signature model extractor has taken less than 15 minutes to be
learnt using the anomalies from two weeks.
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Table 6: Effectiveness of the LogicModel tree (LMT) failure prediction algorithm for fault
type and location
Fault type (Location) Precision Recall F-Measure Accuracy FPR
CPU hog (Bono) 100% 93.529% 96.657% 0.998% 0%
CPU hog (Sprout) 100% 97.059% 98.507% 0.999% 0%
CPU hog (Homestead) 100% 97.041% 98.498% 0.999% 0%
CPU hog (Compute #5) 93.820% 98.817% 96.254% 0.997% 0.236%
CPU hog (Compute #7) 96.875% 91.716% 94.225% 0.996% 0.107%
Excessive workload 100% 100% 100% 1.000% 0%
Memory leak (Bono) 100% 98.810% 99.401% 1.000% 0%
Memory leak (Sprout) 100% 95.833% 97.872% 0.999% 0%
Memory leak (Homestead) 100% 96.429% 98.182% 0.999% 0%
Memory leak (Compute #5) 76.119% 91.071% 82.927% 0.987% 1.031%
Memory leak (Compute #7) 93.333% 75.000% 83.168% 0.989% 0.193%
Packet corruption (Bono) 85.973% 99.476% 92.233% 0.993% 0.669%
Packet corruption (Sprout) 87.558% 99.476% 93.137% 0.994% 0.583%
Packet corruption (Homestead) 99.429% 91.579% 95.342% 0.996% 0.022%
Packet corruption (Compute #5) 100% 100% 100% 1.000% 0%
Packet corruption (Compute #7) 100% 100% 100% 1.000% 0%
Packet latency (Bono) 96.000% 100% 97.959% 0.998% 0.173%
Packet latency (Sprout) 76.777% 84.375% 80.397% 0.984% 1.058%
Packet latency (Homestead) 72.028% 53.646% 61.493% 0.973% 0.864%
Packet latency (Compute #5) 82.857% 75.521% 79.019% 0.984% 0.648%
Packet latency (Compute #7) 62.069% 75.000% 67.925% 0.972% 1.900%
Packet loss (Bono) 100% 73.837% 84.950% 0.991% 0%
Packet loss (Sprout) 99.429% 100% 99.713% 1.000% 0.022%
Packet loss (Homestead) 94.152% 95.833% 94.985% 0.996% 0.215%
Packet loss (Compute #5) 100% 100% 100% 1.000% 0%
Packet loss (Compute #7) 82.266% 99.405% 90.027% 0.992% 0.773%
Correct execution 100% 100% 100% 1.000% 0%
RQ3: Detecting Legal Executions
While the workload conditions do not alter the failure detection and fault lo-
calization capabilities, they may impact on the false positive rate in the absence
of faults. Thus experimented with different types of workloads in the absence of
faults: workload random40 that differs from the workload used in the training
phase for 40% of the cases, and random100 that differs completely from the
workload used in the training phase.
We generated 72 samples for random40 and random100 by running each
workload for 2 hours, producing a total of 144 samples. PreMiSE has been
able to correctly classify all the samples as belonging to failure-free executions.
Jointly with the results discussed for RQ2, we can say that PreMiSE shows a
very low number of false positives, even if we are analyzing data from normal
executions with workloads completely different from those used in the training
phase.
RQ4: Prediction Earliness
We evaluated the earliness of the prediction as the Time-To-General-Prediction
(TTGP), the Time-To-Failure-Specific-Prediction (TTFSP), the Time-To-Failure
for General Prediction (TTF(GP)) and the Time-To-Failure for Failure-Specific
Prediction (TTF(FSP) illustrated in Figure 10.
In the experiments, failures correspond to either system crashes or drops
in the successful SIP call rate below 60% for 5 consecutive minutes. Table 7
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reports the results of the experiment. The columns from fault occurrence to
failure prediction show the time that PreMiSE needed to predict a general
(TTGP) and specific (TTFSP) failure, respectively. PreMiSE has been able to
produce a general failure prediction in some minutes: 5 minutes in the best case,
less than 31 minutes for most of the faults, and 65 minutes in the worst case.
Moreover, PreMiSE has generated the failure specific prediction few minutes
after the general prediction, with a worst case of 35 minutes from the general to
the specific prediction. The readers should notice that we measure the time to
prediction starting with the first activation of the seeded fault, which may not
immediately lead to faulty symptoms.
The columns From failure prediction to failure indicate that the failures are
predicted well in advance, leaving time for a manual resolution of the problem.
PreMiSE has detected both the general and failure specific predictions at least
48 minutes before the failure, which is usually sufficient for a manual interven-
tion. These results are also valuable for the deployment of self-healing routines,
which might be activated well in advance with respect to failures.
PreMiSE predicts failure based on the analysis of OA-PI, which works with
sampling intervals of 5 minutes. Indeed PreMiSE can effectively predict a failure
with few anomalous samples. It could predict failures in a shorter time than 5
minutes with an anomaly detector that requires smaller sampling intervals.
Figure 13: Call success rate over time
Faults of different type have very different impacts on the system, and can
thus result in largely different patterns. Figure 13 exemplifies the different
impact of faults of various types by plotting the percentage of successful calls
in the experiments characterized by the longest and shortest Time-to-Failure,
which correspond to CPU hog and packet corruption faults, respectively. Packet
corruption faults have a gradual impact on the system, while the CPU hog
faults do not cause failures in the first three hours of execution for the reported
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experiment.
Overall, PreMiSE demonstrated to be able to effectively predict failures,
including their type well in advance to the failure time for the four classes of
problems that have been investigated.
RQ5: Comparative Evaluation
We compare PreMiSE to both OA-PI and G-BDA on the same testbed.
OA-PI is a widely adopted industrial anomaly-based tool, G-BDA is a state-of-
the-art signature-based approach. We use OA-PI as a baseline approach, and
G-BDA as a relevant representative of competing approaches. Table 8 reports
precision, recall, F-Measure, accuracy and false positive rate of PreMiSE , OA-
PI and G-BDA.
OA-PI infers the threshold of normal performance for KPI values, and raises
alarms only for persistent anomalies, that is, if the probability that a KPI is
anomalous for 3 of the last 6 intervals is above a certain threshold value [45].
Columns OA-PI (anomalies) and OA-PI (alarms) of Table 8 report all and
the persistent anomalies that OA-PI detects and signal, respectively. In both
cases OA-PI is less effective than PreMiSE : OA-PI does not raise any alarm,
thus failing to predict the failure (recall = 0%, precision and F-measure not
computable), and records far too many anomalies, thus signalling all potential
failures (recall of 100%) diluted in myriads false alarms (false positive rate =
100%). In a nutshell, OA-PI reports every legal executions as a possible fail-
ure. PreMiSE is effective: The high values of the five measures indicate that
PreMiSE predicts most failures with a negligible amount of false positives.
G-BDA is a signature-based approach that collects VM metrics to detect
preliminary symptoms of failures. G-BDA detects both excessive workload and
anomalous virtual machines. G-BDA analyzes a single tier of a distributed
system. Columns G-BDA (single-tier) and G-BDA (multi-tier) of Table 8 report
precision, recall, F-measure, accuracy and FPR of G-BDA, by referring to the
analysis of faults injected in a single VM and faults injected in different tiers,
respectively. In both cases PreMiSE outperforms G-BDA on all five measures,
and reduces FPR from over 2% to 0.05%.
In summary, the PreMiSE combination of anomaly detection and signature-
based analysis is more effective than either of the two techniques used in isola-
tion.
RQ6: Overhead
PreMiSE interacts directly with the system only with the KPI Monitor,
which in our prototype implementation collects the KPIs by means of the SN-
MPv2c monitoring service for Clearwater [25], the Ceilometer telemetry service
for OpenStack [26] and a Linux OS agent that we implemented for Ubuntu. All
other computation is performed on a dedicated node, and does not impact on
the overall performance of the target system. Thus, the PreMiSE overhead on
the running system is limited to the overhead of the monitoring services that
we expect to be very low.
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Table 7: PreMiSE prediction earliness for fault type and pattern
From fault occurrence From failure prediction
to failure prediction to failure
Fault Type (Pattern) TTGP TTFSP TTF (GP) TTF (FSP)
CPU hog (Random) 65 mins 80 mins >12 hours >12 hours
CPU hog (Constant) 45 mins 60 mins >12 hours >12 hours
CPU hog (Exponential) 5 mins 30 mins >12 hours >12 hours
Excessive workload
(Random)
35 mins 50 mins 192 mins 177 mins
Excessive workload
(Constant)
40 mins 55 mins 110 mins 95 mins
Excessive workload
(Exponential)
30 mins 45 mins 80 mins 65 mins
Memory leak (Random) 5 mins 20 mins 55 mins 40 mins
Memory leak (Constant) 5 mins 20 mins 56 mins 41 mins
Memory leak
(Exponential)
5 mins 20 mins 56 mins 41 mins
Packet corruption
(Random)
30 mins 60 mins 121 mins 91 mins
Packet corruption
(Constant)
30 mins 60 mins 172 mins 148 mins
Packet corruption
(Exponential)
30 mins 55 mins 48 mins 23 mins
Packet latency (Random) 45 mins 70 mins 132 mins 107 mins
Packet latency (Constant) 30 mins 60 mins 132 mins 102 mins
Packet latency
(Exponential)
45 mins 60 mins 59 mins 44 mins
Packet loss (Random) 50 mins 65 mins 142 mins 127 mins
Packet loss (Constant) 30 mins 65 mins 85 mins 50 mins
Packet loss
(Exponential)
50 mins 65 mins 52 mins 37 mins
>12 hours indicates the cases of failures that have not been observed within 12 hours,
although in the presence of active faults that would eventually lead to the system failures.
Table 8: Comparative evaluation of PreMiSE and state-of-art approches
Measures PreMiSE
OA-PI
(alarms)
OA-PI
(anomalies)
G-BDA
(single-tier)
G-BDA
(multi-tier)
Precision 98.798% – 94.118% 90.967% 87.933%
Recall 98.797% 0% 100% 90.567% 87.533%
F-Measure 98.797% – 96.970% 90.367% 87.400%
Accuracy 98.797% 5.882% 94.118% 90.567% 87.533%
FPR 0.05% 0% 100% 2.833% 2.3%
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CPU Usage
Memory Usage
50.602%
17.445%
48.699%
14.82% W/O Metric CollectioinW/ Metric Collection
Bytes Written
Bytes Read
74657.611
22586.166
66242.003
20718.237
Packets Received
Packets Sent
0 750 1500 2250 3000
1789.656
1819.612
1783.526
1815.638
Figure 14: PreMiSE overhead
The experimental results confirm the absence of overhead, which means no
measurable difference, on the target system. We only observe small differences
in resource consumption as reported in Figure 14, which reports cpu, memory,
disk and network consumption when the system is executed with and without
the monitoring infrastructure. The monitoring infrastructure has a negligible
impact on disk (measured as read and written bytes) and network (measured
as number of sent and received packets) usage, accounting for few hundreds
bytes over tens of thousands and few packets over thousands, respectively. The
impact on CPU and memory usage is also quite low, with an average increase
of 2.63% and 1.91%, respectively. These results are perfectly compatible with
systems with strong performance requirements, such as telecommunication in-
frastructures.
Threats To Validity
In this article, we reported our experience with an IMS in a network function
virtualization environment. Although we have achieved success predictors under
different runtime conditions, this may not generalize to other cloud systems.
While the approach is generalised easily, it cannot be assumed in advance that
the results of a study will generalise beyond the specific environment in which it
was conducted. This is an external threat to the validity. One way to mitigate
this threat is to analyze other real-world cloud systems. However, there is no
publicly available benchmark from realistic cloud deployments such as Project
Clearwater. To overcome this limitation, we are partnering with industrial
companies to test PreMiSE in their pre-production systems.
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An internal threat to validity is the limited number of faults we examined in
the study. We chose popular faults without apriori knowledge of their behavior.
However, it is possible that there are faults that do not exhibit any performance
deviations. To mitigate the threat mentioned above, we plan to extend the
study with a larger set of experiments, so that statistical significant test can be
meaningfully applicable.
7. Related Work
State-of-the-art techniques for predicting failures and locating the corre-
sponding faults are designed to support system administrators, enable self-
healing solutions or dealing with performance issues [46, 47]. Current techniques
to predict system failures derive abstractions of the behavior of a system in the
form of models and rules, and exploit either signature- or anomaly-based strate-
gies to dynamically reveal symptoms of problems, and predict related failures.
Signature-based approaches capture failure-prone behaviors that indicate
how the monitored system behaves when affected by specific faults, and aim to
reveal faults of the same kinds at runtime. Anomaly-based approaches capture
non-failure-prone behaviors that represent the correct behavior of the moni-
tored system and aim to reveal behaviors that violate these abstractions at
runtime. Performance-related approaches dynamically identify anomalies and
bottlenecks.
Signature-based approaches can accurately predict the occurrences of failures
whose symptoms are encoded in the models that capture the fault signatures,
but are ineffective against failures that do not correspond to signatures encoded
in the models. Anomaly-based approaches can potentially predict any failure,
since they reveal violations of models of the positive behaviors of the application,
but depend on the completeness of the models, and suffer from many false
alarms. In a nutshell, signature-based approaches may miss several failures while
anomaly-based approaches may generate many false alarms.
PreMiSE integrates anomaly- and signature-based approaches to benefit
from both the generality of anomaly-based techniques and the accuracy of
signature-based techniques. While current signature-based approaches derive
failure signatures from application events [23, 14, 16], the original PreMiSE ap-
proach derives failure signatures from anomalies that are good representative of
failure-prone behaviors, and thus particularly effective in predicting failures.
Performance-related approaches address performance problems by detect-
ing anomalies and bottlenecks that do not affect the functional behavior of
the system, and as such are largely complementary to PreMiSE and related
approaches.
7.1. Signature-Based Approaches
The main signature-based approaches are the Vilalta et al.’s approach [23],
hPrefects [14], SEIP [16], Seer [15], Sauvanaud et al. [18], SunCat [10] and the
approach defined by Malik et al. [11].
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Vilalta et al. introduced an approach that mines failure reports to learn
associative rules that relate events that frequently occur prior to system failures
to the failures themselves, and use the mined rules to predict failures at runtime,
before their occurrence [23]. Fu and Zu’s hPrefects approach extends Vilalta et
al.’s rules to clustered architectures [14]. hPrefects learns how failures propagate
in time and space from failure records, represents temporal correlations with a
spherical covariance model, and spatial correlations with stochastic models, and
includes a cluster-wide failure predictor that uses the learned models to estimate
the probability that a failure occurs in the current execution.
Salfner et al.’s SEIP approach synthesizes a semi-Markov chain model that
includes information about error frequency and error patterns [16], and signals
a possible system failure, when the model indicates that the probability that
the current execution will produce a failure exceeds a given threshold.
Ozchelik and Yilmaz’s Seer technique combines hardware and software mon-
itoring to reduce the runtime overhead, which is particularly important in
telecommunication systems [15]. Seers trains a set of classifiers by labeling
the monitored data, such as caller-callee information and number of machine
instructions executed in a function call, as passing or failing executions, and
uses the classifiers to identify the signatures of incoming failures.
Sauvanaud et al. capture symptoms of service level agreement violations:
They collect application-agnostic data, and classify system behaviors as normal
and anomalous with a Random Forest algorithm, and show that collecting data
from an architectural tier impacts on the accuracy of the predictions [18].
Nistor and Ravindranath’s SunCat approach predicts performance problems
in smartphone applications by identifying calling patterns of string getters that
may cause performance problems for large inputs, by analyzing similar calling
patterns for small inputs [10].
Malik et al. [11] developed an automated approach to detect performance
deviations before they become critical problems. The approach collects perfor-
mance counter variables, extracts performance signatures, and then uses signa-
tures to predict deviations. Malik et al. built signatures with a supervised and
three unsupervised approaches, and provide experimental evidence that the su-
pervised approach is more accurate than the unsupervised ones even with small
and manageable subsets of performance counters.
Lin et al.’s [48] MING technique uses an ensemble of supervised machine
learning models to predict failures in cloud systems by analyzing both temporal
and spatial data. Compared to PreMiSe, MING does not consider the multi-
level nature of cloud systems and can predict failures only at the granularity of
the host.
El-Sayed et al. [49] note that unsuccessful jobs across different clusters ex-
hibit patterns that distinguish them from successful executions. On the basis of
this observation, they use random forests to identify signatures of unsuccessful
terminations of jobs or tasks running in the cluster. Predictions at the job level
are then used to mitigate the effect of unsuccessful job executions.
PreMiSE introduces several novel features that improve over current signature-
based approaches: (i) it creates signatures from anomalies, which better rep-
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resent failure occurrences than general events, (ii) predicts the type of failure
that will occur, (iii) integrates and correlates data extracted from all layers and
components of a multi-tier distributed architecture, and (iv) restricts the scope
of the location of the causing faults.
7.2. Anomaly-Based Approaches
The main anomaly-based approaches are the algorithms proposed by Fulp et
al. [50], Jin et al. [12] and Guan et al. [19], and the Tiresias [13], ALERT [20],
PREPARE [21] and OA-PI [22] technologies.
Fulp et al.’s approach and PREPARE address specific classes of failures.
Fulp et al. defined a spectrum-kernel support vector machine approach to pre-
dict disk failures using system log files [50], while PREPARE addresses perfor-
mance anomalies in virtualized systems [21]. Fulp et al. exploit the sequential
nature of system messages, the message types and the message tags, to distill
features, and use support vector machine models to identify message sequences
that deviate from the identified features as symptoms of incoming failures. PRE-
PARE combines a 2-dependent Markov model to predict attribute values with
a tree-augmented Bayesian network to predict anomalies. Differently from both
thees approaches that are specific to some classes of failures, PreMiSE is general
and can predict multiple types of failures simultaneously.
Guan et al. proposed an ensemble of Bayesian Network models to character-
ize the normal execution states of a cloud system [19], and to signal incoming
failures when detecting states not encoded in the models. ALERT introduces
the notion of alert states, and exploits a triple-state multi-variant stream clas-
sification scheme to capture special alert states and generate warnings about
incoming failures [20]. Tiresias integrates anomaly detection and Dispersion
Frame Technique (DFT) to predict anomalies [13].
Jin et al. use benchmarking and production system monitoring to build an
analytic model of the system that can then be used to predict the performance of
a legacy system under different conditions to avoid unsatisfactory service levels
due to load increases [12].
Anomaly-based approaches are inevitably affected by the risk of generat-
ing many false positives as soon as novel legal behaviors emerge in the mon-
itored system. PreMiSE overcomes the issue of false positives by integrating
an anomaly detection approach with a signature-based technique that issues
alarms only when the failure evidence is precise enough. The results reported
in Section 6 show that PreMiSE dramatically improves over current anomaly-
based detection techniques, including modern industrial-level solutions such as
IBM OA-PI [22].
7.3. Performance-Related Approaches
Performance anomaly detection approaches predict performance issues and
identify bottlenecks in production systems, while performance regression ap-
proaches detect performance changes [46].
Classic performance anomaly detection approaches work with historical data:
they build statistical models of low-level system metrics to detect performance
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issues of distributed applications [51, 52, 53, 54]. They derive formal represen-
tations, called signatures, that are easy to compute and retrieve, to capture
the state of the system, and quickly identify similar performance issues that
occurred in the past. These approaches aim to discriminate different types of
performance issues in order to aid root cause analysis.
The most recent performance anomaly detectors, BARCA, Root and TaskIn-
sight, do not need historical data. BARCA monitors system metrics, computes
performance indicators, like mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis,
and combines SVMs, to detects anomalies, with multi-class classifier analysis,
to identify related anomalous behaviors, like deadlock, livelock, unwanted syn-
chronization, and memory leaks [55]. Root works as a Platform-as-a-Service
(PaaS) extension [56]. It detect performance anomalies in the application tier,
classifies their cause as either workload change or internal bottleneck, and lo-
cates the most likely causes of internal bottlenecks with weighted algorithms.
TaskInsight detects performance anomalies in cloud applications, by analysing
system level metrics, such as CPU and memory utilization, with a clustering
algorithm, to identify abnormal application threads[57]. It detects and identifies
abnormal application threads by analyzing system level metrics such as CPU
and memory utilization.
Differently from PreMiSE, these approaches (i) do not locate the faulty re-
source that causes the performance anomaly, and (ii) cannot detect performance
problems at different tiers, which remains largely an open challenge [46].
Performance regression approaches detect changes in software system per-
formance during development aiming to prevent performance degradation in
the production system [58]. They reveal changes in the overall performance of
the development system due to changes in the code. Ghaith et al. [59] detect
performance regression by comparing transaction profiles to reveal performance
anomalies that can occur only if the application changes. Transaction profiles
reflects the lower bound of the response time in a transaction under idle con-
dition, and do not depend on the workload. Foo et al. [60] detect performance
regressions in heterogeneous environments in the context of data centers, by
building an ensemble of models to detect performance deviations. Foo et al.
aggregate performance deviations from different models, by using simple voting
as well as weighted algorithms to determine whether the current behavior really
deviate from the expected one, and is not a simple environment-specific vari-
ation. Performance regression approaches assume a variable system code base
and a stable runtime environment, while PreMiSE collects operational data to
predict failures and localize faults caused by a variable production environment
in an otherwise stable system code base.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we presented PreMiSE, an original approach to automatically
predict failures and locate the corresponding faults in multi-tier distributed sys-
tems, where faults are becoming the norm rather then the exception. Predicting
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failure occurrence as well as locating the responsible faults produce information
that is essential for mitigating the impact of failures and improving the depend-
ability of the systems. Current failure prediction approaches rarely produce
enough information to locate the faults corresponding to the predicted failures,
and either suffer from false positives (anomaly-based) or work with patterns of
discrete events and do not cope well with failures that impact on continuous
indicators (signature-based).
PreMiSE originally blends anomaly- and signature-based techniques to ad-
dress failures that impact on continuous indicators, and to precisely locate the
corresponding faults. It uses data time series analysis and Granger causality
tests to accurately reveal anomalies in the behavior of the system as a whole,
probabilistic classifiers to distill signatures that can distinguish failure-free al-
beit anomalous behaviors from failure-prone executions, and signature-based
techniques to accurately distinguish malign from benign anomalies, predict the
type of the incoming failures, and locate the sources of the incoming failures.
PreMiSE executes on a node independent from the target system, and limits
the online interactions with the monitored applications to metric collection.
In this paper, we report the results of experiments executed on the implemen-
tation of a Clearwater IP Multimedia Subsystem, which is a system commonly
adopted by telecommunication companies for their VOIP (voice over IP), video
and message services. The results confirm that PreMiSE can predict failures
and locate faults with higher precision and less false positives than state of the
approaches, without incurring in extra execution costs on the target system.
Differently from state-of-the-art approaches, PreMiSE can effectively identify
the type of the possible failure and locate the related faults for the kinds of
faults and failures used in the training phase.
We designed and studied PreMiSE in the context of multi-tier distributed
systems, to predict failures and locate faults at the level of individual tier of the
nodes of the system. Studying the PreMiSE approach in the context of other
systems that can be extensively monitored is a promising research direction.
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Appendix A. KPI List
Metrics used in the experiments grouped by tier.
Linux server
CPU user cpu utility, system cpu utility, busy cpu utility,
wait io cpu utility
Network bytes received per sec, bytes transmitted per sec
System context switches per sec, pages swapped in per sec,
pages swapped out per sec, pages faults per sec, total
num of processes per sec
Virtual
Memory
percentage of swapped space used, percentage of mem-
ory used, percentage of memory in buffers, percentage
of memory cached.
Socket sockets in use
I/O device name, avg wait time, avg request queue length,
read bytes per sec, write bytes per sec
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OpenStack
Compute existence of instance and instance type, allocated and
used RAM in MB, CPU time used, avg CPU utilisa-
tion, num of VCPUs, num of read and write requests,
avg rate of read and write requests per sec, volume of
reads and writes in Byte, avg rate of reads and writes
in Byte per sec, num of incoming bytes on a VM net-
work interface, avg rate per sec of incoming bytes on
a VM network interface, num of outgoing bytes on a
VM network interface, avg rate per sec of outgoing
bytes on a VM network interface, num of incoming
packets on a VM network interface, avg rate per sec of
incoming packets on a VM network interface, num of
outgoing packets on a VM network interface, avg rate
per sec of outgoing packets on a VM network interface
Network existence of network, creation requests for this net-
work, update requests for this network, existence of
subnet, creation requests for this subnet, update re-
quests for this subnet, existence of port, creation re-
quests for this port, update requests for this port, ex-
istence of router, creation requests for this router, up-
date requests for this router, existence of floating ip,
creation requests for this floating ip, update requests
for this floating ip
Controller image polling, uploaded image size, num of update on
the image, num of upload of the image, num of delete
on the image, image is downloaded, image is served
out
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Clearwater
CPU and Mem-
ory
SNMP CPU and memory usage stats
Latency avg latency, variance, highest call latency,
lowest call latency
Incoming Re-
quests
num of incoming requests
Rejected Re-
quests
num of requests rejected due to overload
Queue avg request queue size, variance, highest
queue size, lowest queue
Cx Interface avg latency, variance, highest latency and
lowest latency seen on the Cx interface
Multimedia-
Auth Requests
avg latency, variance, highest latency and
lowest latency seen on Multimedia-Auth
Requests
Server-
Assignment
Requests
avg latency, variance, highest latency and
lowest latency seen on Server-Assignment
Requests
User-
Authorization
Requests
avg latency, variance, highest latency and
lowest latency seen on User-Authorization
Requests
Location-
Information
Requests
avg latency, variance, highest latency
and lowest latency seen on Location-
Information Requests
Sprout avg latency, variance, highest and lowest la-
tency between Sprout and Homer XDMS
TCP Connec-
tions
num of parallel TCP connections
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